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Asset pricing models with atomistic agents typically relax assumptions concerning 
rationality and/or homogenous information in order to track endogenous bubbles. In this 
model, identically informed rational agents hold a Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) for a 
single new technology asset at IPO, yet they differ with respect to risk aversion. By 
mapping risk preferences to strategies, we use marginal supply and demand functions to 
solve for the PLM if REE holds. By relaxing the assumption of complete knowledge of 
agent's tastes and wealth, post-IPO bubbles emerge where the Actual Law of Motion is an 
amplification (bubble) of the price processes vs. the PLM.  
 
Introduction 
Homogeneous information, uniform tastes and agents' rationality are cornerstone 
assumptions for capital asset pricing, but prior art conclude that under these conditions, 
non-atomistic agents have no incentive to trade and the expected equilibrium price will 
be stable. These results do not correspond to observation of capital asset markets, as trade 
is evident and bubbles are revealed as they occasionally burst. Over the past decades, 
major stock-market bubbles were associated with significant impact of new technologies 
on the real economy (1929, 2000) or new trade mechanisms like portfolio insurance and 
program trading (1987). The question we address here is whether unobservability of 
preferences and wealth might result in bubbles, especially following new-technology 
IPO.  
Divergence of real and financial assets from fundamental valuation has been 
documented since the early 80's (Shiller (1981), Grossman and Shiller (1981), Summers 
(1986)). Academics, mostly, define financial bubbles as deviations from fundamentals 
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that persist for periods that are too long to be explained by response to external shocks. 
The first researchers of the subject, Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1946), attributed such 
deviations to speculation which they consider rational. Both addressed speculation as a 
byproduct of differences in risk aversion where more risk-averse agents "sell" some of 
the risk to less risk-averse ones. The more risk-averse agents trade based on fundamental 
values while their counterparts adopt speculative strategies. It turns out that Keynes and 
Hicks see speculation as a tool to reallocate risk among trading agents. In this model, we 
segregate agents by investment strategies based on different measures of risk aversion, 
thus precisely fit their approach.  
Equilibrium analysis of capital asset pricing with unobservable fundamentals 
started with Feldman's Ph.D. dissertation (1983), and followed in articles by Dothan and 
Feldman (1986), Detemple (1986, 1991), Gennotte (1986), Feldman (1989, 1992), 
Detemple and Murthy (1994) and Coles, Loewenstein and Suay (1995). In general, the 
goal in the above mentioned models is to explicitly solve for the unobservable moments 
endogenously. They view the price process as a noisy realization of the unobservable 
fundamental moments. In most cases, the realized price process is a function of the 
conditional unobservable moments of the production factors, production function and 
agents' first and second utility function derivatives. Another approach has been taken by 
Kurz (1994a, 1994b, 1996 and 1997) who constructed the theory of Rational Beliefs. 
According to Kurz, agents do not possess complete structural knowledge of the 
environment and its changes, especially changes in technology, tastes and economic 
institutions. Thus, there is a question whether such changes are random deviations around 
a fixed mean value function of a stationary process, or whether they reflect changes in the 
mean value function itself. Beliefs must satisfy Kurz's Rationality Principle, that call for 
consistency of beliefs with the data. Essentially, beliefs are formed by assuming agents 
act as econometricians who apply a learning model on realized returns and use the 
coefficients to plan ahead.  
Rational expectations models of bubbles are attractive as they adhere to core 
economic theory. This is why these models were the first to appear in the late '70s - early 
'80s (Blanchard (1979), Flood and Garber (1980), Blanchard and Watson (1982), Tirole 
(1982)). Bubbles in these models evolve based on a self-fulfilling rational expectations 
mechanism, which supports the bubble as long as it exists, and the price crashes when the 
mechanism disappears. These models do not specify what endogenous conditions must be 
satisfied for a bubble to evolve, knowing that a stable economy have operated with the 
same agents and technology prior to the boom, and under what inherent terms will the 
bubble blast. Starting from the mid '80s equilibrium models of bubbles typically involve 
explicit or implicit assumptions of irrational behavior by a certain group of agents. Some 
models assume noise trading (e.g., Kyle (1985), Black (1986), De-long, Shleifer, 
Summers and Waldmann (1990), Binswanger (1999), and Levy, Levy and Solomon 
(2000). Others assume overreaction to news (Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), De-Bondt 
and Thaler (1987), Kent, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998)) or signaling between 
investors who have asymmetric information (Allen and Gale (1992), (2000a), (2000b), 
Allen and Gorton (1993), Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993)). The economic meaning 
of such assumptions is that either fundamental information is not available to all agents 
(asymmetric information), and/or different agents process information in different ways 
(the noise-trader approach). Binswanger (1999) extends De-Long et al.'s model by 
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allowing dynamic changes of the fundamentals due to technological changes. On another 
front, the emergence of derivative securities and thereby Portfolio Insurance (PI) is 
claimed to contribute to the underlying assets volatility if markets are not complete 
(Grossman (1988a), (1988b), Grossman and Zhou, (1996)).1 Research about PI boosted 
after 1987 when academia and government-committees have studied their potential 
contribution to the stock market crash (Brady, 1988, SEC, 1987).  
In this paper we show that agents' inability to observe others' optimal trading 
strategies, classified to Momentum and Contrarian, might result in amplified volatility 
and return if the Momentum strategy dominates or a dimmed price process if the 
Contrarian dominates. We thus specify explicitly positive (and negative) mispricing, 
while observability yields the Merton (1971) rational expectations process. This model 
uses the notion of incomplete information at and post-IPO to establish a model of 
bubbles, thus should not be considered as a model of IPO.    
Section I describes optimal dynamic investment rules for non-price-taking agent 
groups, based on Merton (1971). In Section II we define the groups, derive their marginal 
supply and demand functions for shares and solve the equilibrium price. In Section III we 
relax the complete information assumption and derive ex-post moments vs. Rational 
Expectations Equilibrium (REE), resulting in Momentum Dominance Equilibria (MDE) 
or Contrarian Dominance Equilibria (CDE). In section IV we discuss bubbles and Section 
V concludes.  
 
I. The Economic Setting 
Consider a reduced form of Merton (1971) economy in which we address the 
portfolio selection problem with incomplete information2. The investment opportunity 
set is comprised of two assets, a riskless bond yielding exogenous, fixed rate of return r 
and a single risky asset. The latter represents a new-technology equity share for which 
there is no return and variability track-record.3 All agents have the same information thus 
                                                          
1 In order to insure a portfolio, an investor may either hold the underlying risky-asset long and buy a put 
option with a strike equal to the desired insurance level, or he may buy a call option with a risk-free asset. 
In both cases, the negative tail of the distribution is sold (for a fair premium) to the issuer of the option. The 
latter may bare the risk, and the underlying asset price will not be affected, or he may replicate a Portfolio 
Insurance (PI) strategy in the underlying securities market to transfer his risk to other investors. By doing 
so, such agent is executing a momentum (speculative) trading strategy vs. "the market" as long as he is 
atomistic. However, if the investor affects market price, the latter will rise and eventually revert to the 
fundamental. It turns out that by modeling momentum strategies in the underlying assets we capture the 
spillover of the demand for portfolio insurance to the contrarian agents, who are essentially suppliers of PI. 
2 Merton (1971) shows that the effect of a fixed planning horizon on the intertemporal portfolio-selection 
problem comes through the riskless capitalization factor re Ttr /)1( )(  , applied on a constant displacement in 
the HARA-type utility function, termed . This function is strictly concave and monotonically declines in t. 
For a long enough horizon T, this factor is marginally constant when T is far ahead and declines at faster 
rates as Tt  , reaching 0 at T. Particularly throughout the last phase, systematic effects on the stock weight 
in the portfolio emerge. Since we want to present different portfolio effects, we shall ignore the time-effects 
by assuming that T is far enough for all agents, an assumption that corresponds with IPO at t=0. 
3 In the Merton (1971) model there is no "hedging demand" which implies a certain degree of myopia that 
the  present model inherits. Since the context here is for new-technology shares with idiosyncratic risk, this 
short-coming may be of less importance. Alternatively, as noted in Ross (1975), one may consider the 
above investors as institutions for which the myopia deficiency is less important than for an individual 
investor. 
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the return generating process of the stock is assumed by all to follow a discrete-time 
Geometric Brownian Motion, being the Perceived Law of Motion (PLM). We assume 
that agents do not know each other's wealth and utility function. We classify atomistic, 
expected utility maximizing individual agents based on the direction of their marginal 
trade, adopting the terms "Momentum" and "Contrarian" strategies, as will formally be 
presented below.  
New information about the real capital asset's value arrives periodically through a 
normally distributed noise tz . Due to the unobservability of other agents' marginal trade, 
we establish the equilibrium price through trade in a tatonnement clearing mechanism. 
Since we endogenously solve for the return generating process, we (and not the agents) 
can compare it with Merton's (1971) REE price process and specify positive or negative 
bubbles, as if an equivalent economy existed. Finally, we assume that there are no 
transaction costs, taxes, or other frictions.  
 
A. Agents 
Agents are classified by two generic strategies - Momentum (M), whereby an 
increase in wealth call for increasing the amount invested in shares, and Contrarian (C), 
according to which an increase in wealth result in reducing the amount invested in shares. 
Strategies and their magnitude depend on the specific HARA-type utility function 
parameters, as illustrated below.  
The PLM is a Geometric Brownian Motion with constant ˆ  and ˆ , 
)ˆˆ(ˆ tztPPd tttt   . Under complete information and Rational Expectations (RE) 
the realized stock price moments must comply with the PLM. Let tPNS ttktk   ,,,  be the 
stock value held by individual agent k at t, where tkN ,  is the number of shares and tP  
their price.  NN
k
tk  ,  is the number of shares issued at the IPO. Define bond value 
held by the agent tBQD ttktk    ,,, , where Q is quantity of bonds and B their price (bond 
are available to all agents at unlimited supply), and let tktktk WS ,,, /  and 
tktktk WD ,,, /-1  . W is the wealth invested in stock and bond. All 0t  values 
represent IPO allocation. Thus  
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Such a wealth-conservation process4 is frequently presented as 
   tzWtrrWW ttktktktkttk   ˆ))ˆ((1ˆ ,,,,, .  (2) 
                                                          
4 Note that the last equality is equivalent to equation [10] in Merton's (1971) discrete time prolog to the 
continuous time model. 
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Samuelson (1969), Friend and Blume (1975) and Ross (1975) were the first to 
analyze such wealth accumulation processes in discrete-time while the continuous-time 
equivalent has been pioneered by Merton (1969, 1971 and 1973). Using a Taylor-series 
expansion to estimate )ˆ( , ttkWU   up to the second order, where U is a von-Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function, and applying the expectation operator, we get5 
    tWWUtrrWWUWUWUE tktktktktktktkttk  22,2,,,,,,, ˆ)(
2
1
)ˆ()()()ˆ(  .  (3) 
The first order condition of (3) with respect to K,t  is, 
 0ˆ)()ˆ()(
)( 2
,
2
,,,,
,
 

tktktktktk
tk
WWUrWWU
d
UdE
. (4) 
Solving for tk , we get  
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
 , (5) 
and by using the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, 
)(
)(
,
,,
,,
tk
tktk
tkW
WU
WWU
R


 , we obtain the familiar relationship, similar in form to the models 
of the aforementioned authors, 
 
2
,,
,
ˆ
ˆ1



r
R tkW
tk

 . (6) 
Let all individuals have a hyperbolic utility function in wealth of the following 
HARA type 
 

 











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1
1
),(
W
etWU t . (7) 
We use this utility function since agents with different attitudes toward risk apply 
different dynamic strategies that are simple to obtain from (7) and are the building blocks 
of this model. This function can produce relative or absolute measures of risk aversion 
that both can be constant, decreasing or increasing in wealth. Table 1, in Appendix 1, 
summarizes this function's properties. By fixing tkWR ,,  in (6) we obtain the optimal 
investment rule for individual agent k,  
  kktttktttk
k
ttttkttkttk BQPNPNW 


   ,,
*
,,
*
,
ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆ , (8) 
where kk   1 , 2ˆ
ˆˆ



r
 .6  
                                                          
5 Note that neglecting changes higher than the second order when share prices follow log-normal 
distribution does not affect total demand for shares (specifically the demand for "hedging", elaborated in 
Merton (1973)).  
6 This type of utility functions embodies a displacement factor 
KK  that, if negative, represents a demand 
for "safety net", or insurance level to the agents' wealth. It implies replication of a call option by Constant 
Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI) with a multiplier 1/  Mm   and a floor 0MM . 
Alternatively, agents who have a positive displacement factor essentially supply portfolio insurance to the 
market, thus mimicking a put option. A related notion has been presented by Leland (1980), Grossman and 
Vila (1989), Black and Perold (1992) Grossman and Zhou (1996) and others. 
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II. Marginal Supply and Demand Functions for Shares 
In models with atomistic investors, the stochastic price path is exogenous, 
observable, and unaffected by the agent's trade; thus, the equilibrium path is the 
stochastic process itself. However, in a partially observable economy we need an 
additional degree of freedom to solve the system, and that is provided by the marginal 
supply and demand functions for shares. 
By definition, the number of shares held by agent k at t+Δt is equal to the number 
of shares she held at t, plus an optimal, unknown at that stage, marginal trade over Δt, 
tkttkttk NNN ,,,   . Henceforth lowercase k, c, and m indicate individual variables 
while capital letters indicate group-wise aggregate equivalents. Aggregation by group is 
permissible since both risk parameters  and  are assumed identical group-wise. Note 
that while individual agents are atomistic, group-aggregates determine the share price 
endogenously. We omit the optimality symbol "*" in (8) from now until the end of this 
section, when we derive equilibrium, for simplicity of notation. 
 
A. The Contrarian Strategy 
Denote the aggregation of contrarian agents by subscript "C". By replacing 
ttCtCttC NNN   ,,,  in (8) and solving for ttCN  ,  we obtain 
   

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ˆ~ˆ
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C
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C
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
, (9) 
where tttCttC BQD   ,,
~
 and d ttP   represents the marginal demand function for 
shares. Equation (9) can be rewritten as   
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that will satisfy the properties of a demand function if it maintains a strictly 
negative slope  0
)( ,





ttC
d
tt
N
P
 and weakly-positive convexity  0
)( 2,





ttC
d
tt
dN
P
.7 The 
class of agents for whom the contrarian strategy is optimal is defined in Proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 1: 
Agents who adopt a Contrarian strategy must have taste parameters 
ttC
tC
C
N
N


,
,ˆ , and 
C
ttC
C
D

  ,
~
 which imply that they have DRRA and DARA attitude 
                                                          
7 In this case, strict positive convexity will hold due to the first requirement as presented in Appendix 2. 
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toward risk if 
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Proof: See Appendix 2.  
 
B. The Momentum Strategy  
Let type M individual agents have a convex payoff schedule, being an investment 
rule whereby an increase in wealth result in an increasing exposure to shares in their 
portfolio, and vice versa. Following the procedure as detailed above, their marginal trade 
is  
   
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where s ttP   is the marginal supply function for shares, which may be phrased,  
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A marginal supply function for shares must satisfy strictly positive slope 
0
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, although in our case strict 
convexity will hold. The taste parameters that satisfy a Momentum investment strategy 
comply with Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: 
Individual agents who adopt a Momentum strategy must have a measure of risk 
aversion and displacement factor that satisfy 


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, which complies with 
DRRA and DARA attitude toward risk. Such agents will not have CRRA or CARA 
attitudes toward risk. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 3. 
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A graphical illustration of the marginal supply and demand functions derived 
above for shares is presented in Figure 1.8 In the following section we establish 
Walrasian equilibrium based on these marginal functions. 
 
Figure 1 
Marginal Supply and Demand Functions for Shares 
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Figure 1 describes graphically the marginal supply and demand functions for shares by 
agents M and C. An increase in price implies an increase in the number of shares by agent M 
( 0,  tMN ) and a decrease in the number of shares by agent C ( 0,  tCN ). Note that for a 
given price increase, the horizontal gap between both functions is the Bid-Ask spread. Finally note 
that the "supply" and "demand" tags were attached to these functions in order to correspond to 
their common representation in economics, yet their names should really been reversed. The 
values we used to draw these functions are:  
25 50 10,2.1 ,8.20 ,4.0 ,7.166 ,6.0ˆ  CMCMCCMM D,D,NN  
 
C. Equilibrium  
Though taste parameters remain fixed, aggregate marginal supply/demand change 
periodically due to changes in wealth allocation among agent groups. Individuals submit 
matching vectors of quantities and share prices, being their marginal supply/demand 
function, to a clearing agency assumed to operate in a tâtonnement procedure. The 
tâtonnement aggregates individual supply and demand functions and by clearing excess 
marginal demand set a new equilibrium price each period.9 We show that the resulting 
price path satisfies Pareto-optimality, yet rational-expectations equilibrium hold if the 
                                                          
8 These marginal supply and demand functions for shares also provide a basis for trade under a certain 
group of REE equilibria, among them the Merton (1971) model, yet, this issue is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
9 Note that since the marginal functions are convex and defined on the same plane for all agents, 
aggregation is allowed across individual tastes.  
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PLM equal the ALM, being equivalent to Merton's (1971) price process. The Walrasian 
equilibrium conditions are,  
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By using tNNN tMtC   ,,,  in (9) and (11) and using the wealth-conserving 
budget constraint (1), we solve for the equilibrium price of shares * ttP  , 
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Asterisks represent Pareto-optimal equilibrium values. Equation (14) translates to 
the continuous time equivalent when 0t ,  
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This equilibrium price is consistent with previous results, being a weighted-
average value of wealth managed by each group, weighted by the divergence of agents' 
measure of risk aversion K  from ˆ . Here however the displacement effect of CM    
plays an important role as it distinguishes strategies by marginal trade10. Comparing to 
popular utility functions, if 0 CM   then, by Table 1, (15) reduces to the CRRA 
case. It turns out that this solution for the HARA-type utility function is a generalization 
of Ross's (1975) and Friend and Blume's (1975) results for multiple agents based on 
CRRA utility functions. Further, if we assume that all agents have identical risk 
parameters, ( CMCM      ; ), (15) reduces to Merton's (1971) optimal 
investment rule with a single agent (ibid. equation [49]). The above-mentioned authors 
derived their results under the assumptions of exogenous, visible price process with price 
taking investors. (15) is similar in form to these results but different in meaning. On one 
hand it shows that the equilibrium share price process satisfy a Pareto-optimum asset 
allocation each period, regardless of the existence of REE. On the other hand, price path 
(15) is determined by the risk-aversion-weighted wealth of all agents M and C who hold 
the asset.  
 
III. Temporary deviations from REE - Bubbles 
We argue that if the assumption that all agents know all other's tastes and wealth 
is relaxed, than the Actual Law of Motion (ALM) will most likely be different than the 
PLM. It appears reasonable to assume that during IPO pre-sale and after trade begins for 
the share, agents are unable to deduce other's strategies from market prices thus non-REE 
                                                          
10 The equilibrium price in (14) exists and is unique since the utility functions from which the supply and 
demand functions were derived are monotone, and strictly concave over the entire domain. Existence and 
uniqueness can be proved by one of the fixed-point theorems for smooth, continuous functions, e.g., 
Debreu (in Theory of Value, 1959) or Kakutani (in McKenzie L., On Equilibrium in Graham's Model of 
World Trade, Econometrica, Vol. 22, pp. 147-161, 1954) 
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pricing might prevail. The divergence of the ALM from PLM will last longer if the share 
is of a new-technology since idiosyncratic risk makes dynamic learning a longer and 
more complex process. Such divergence will take the shape of a "boom" and "crash" 
pattern if the return and variability are serially correlated at each phase separately. In the 
following sub-sections we show that this will be the case for the "boom" phase, while the 
"crash" is discussed in the next section.  
 
A. Average Growth Rates 
In order to evaluate the realized average return as a function of the expected 
return when agent heterogeneity is unobservable, take the expected value of (14) and find 
its time differential,  
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Since tKD ,  corresponds to the optimal amount held in shares at each period, we 
replace it with KK
K
tKtK SD 
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, which is a reorganization of (8), being the 
agent's investment strategy, but now denoted in terms of the amount held in bonds. 
Replace the bond strategy into (16), multiply by t and divide through by tP  to obtain the 
actual return process 
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Rearrange terms to represent the above in proportional values and obtain 
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*
tt   is a linear function of the risk-
premium over each time interval t. In order to satisfy REE,  ˆ*  tt  must hold, for 
which condition 1t  and 0 CM   are necessary and sufficient conditions as can 
be deduced from (17). Assuming zero displacements, if 1t  holds, the realized return 
will be an amplification of ˆ  and if 1t  it will be dimmed, i.e., a negative mispricing. 
B. Volatility 
The variance of the actual share price process, (14) is  
 
2
2
,, ˆ
ˆ
)( 

















C
tC
M
tM
tt
SS
N
PVar , 
 21 
or, by replacing 
N
N tK
tK
,
,  , the instantaneous standard deviation of price change 
is 
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That is, the actual price change variability is a zero-constant linear function of the 
expected variability, with t  serving as the coefficient. If 1t  the ex-post price path 
will be identical to the ex-ante, satisfying REE; if 1t  the realization will be an 
amplification of the perceived variability and if 1t  the realized variability will be a 
dimmed multiple of ˆ .  
It is important to note that for both moments, ˆ  and ˆ , a crowding-out effect 
intensifies the divergence of the realized moments from the perceived ones. This 
crowding-out has no limit under MDE but it is limited for the CDE equilibrium as 
presented in sub-section C below. The reason for the crowding-out under MDE is that 
agents M buy shares from agents C when 1t .
11 By doing so, t  further increases 
above its previous level and the crowding-out (stochastically) intensifies in time. The 
higher the share price grows above the PLM price, agents M demand more shares but 
agents C have less to offer, thus the periodic equilibrium price closes at higher and higher 
levels, for declining trade volumes.  
C. Dynamic Stability 
This sub-section presents the technical properties of the dynamic evolution of the 
boom phase only, while reversion to REE is discussed in the next section. In general, 
dynamic stability properties of (the expected value of) a process like (14) are analyzed by 
adding its homogenous and particular solutions for a given seed, as it is a first order 
linear difference equation of the type BAPP tt  1 . Specifying the initial condition 0P  
(the IPO price) determines the solution sequence ,...,,, 3210 PPPP , where each term is 
found by ...,,tBAPP tt 321    1  . By a Theorem of linear first order difference 
equations, the solution for the sequence can be expressed in terms of 0P , A and B in the 
following way,  
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diverges, unless 0PPt  . Rearranging (14) to conform with the above layout yields 
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11 There is a secondary crowding-out effect that persists even when 1t , yet with reasonable risk 
aversion parameters and equal initial wealth allocation it requires 10-20 years for that effect to mature. As 
noted above, our horizon for post-IPO bubbles is much shorter.  
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 thus 
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This model thus maintains three equilibria sets, depending on the IPO allocation 
between agents C and M: REE equilibria (no bubbles), Momentum Dominance Equilibria 
(MDE, positive bubbles) and Contrarian Dominance Equilibria (CDE, negative 
mispricing).   
1) If conditions 10  , and 0 CM   hold at IPO date, the expected ALM 
grows at the expected value of the PLM, resulting in REE. The REE price path can be 
constructed at a continuum of agents' wealth and taste combinations, all maintain 
ALM=PLM, but each with a different trade level. The analysis of trade is not discussed in 
this paper. 
2) Momentum Dominance Equilibria will evolve if inequality 10   holds (for 
0 CM  ) at IPO date, generating positive bubbles whereby 













ˆ
ˆ
*
*
tt
tt
. Should 
0 CM  , average return will change with the inequality sign. There is no upper limit 
to the potential divergence of the ALM from the PLM.  
3) Contrarian Dominance Equilibria will emerge if 10   holds at the IPO, 
generating negative mispricing with 














ˆ
ˆ
*
*
tt
tt
 if 0 CM  . As in the previous case, 
if 0 CM  , the average return will increase/decline with the inequality sign, being a 
displacement to the price kernel. Unlike the MDE case however, here the ALM will 
converge in finite time to a steady state level given by the t=0 PLM 
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IV. Analysis of Equilibria and Crashes 
A. The Benchmark - REE Equilibria 
As a benchmark for discussing bubbles, it appears advantageous to analyze the 
conditions underlying REE equilibria. In order to satisfy REE, ex-ante estimates must 
hold also ex-post, i.e., both conditions 
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at (17) and (18) must hold. The first condition, 1
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be solved for M  since MC   1 . In this case the proportion of shares agents M hold 
out of total shares outstanding is a constant satisfying 
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which guaranties   ˆ*  tt . The second condition requires zero-sum 
displacement factors and, in combination with the first condition, assures   ˆ*  tt . 
Assuming conditions (19) hold, equation (20) shows that there is a continuum of risk-
aversion combinations that satisfy REE. This functional relationship between risk 
aversions and the market price for risk is graphically presented in Figure 2. One can 
observe that the REE line serves as a border-line that distinguishes between the MDE and 
CDE equilibria types. 
 
Figure 2 
Rational Expectations Equilibrium For  
Varying Levels of Risk Aversion and a Given  
 
 
For a given REE
M  there is a continuum of attainable REE equilibria that will prevail for 
given risk aversions and market price for risk, ˆ (here ˆ =1). Any combination between risk 
aversions and a given ˆ  that lies in the area above the REE
M  (i.e., 10  ) line is a (temporary) 
Momentum Dominance Equilibrium (MDE), while below this line the (temporary) Contrarian 
Dominance Equilibrium (CDE) will prevail.  
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 one can see that if agents who buy shares at IPO 
are more risk-averse 0  will decline and if less risk-averse agents participate, the value 
of 0  increases.  
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B. Bubbles - Discussion and Illustration 
By definition, bubbles are temporary phenomena throughout which prices diverge 
from REE. In this model it is sufficient to assume incomplete information about agent's 
tastes and wealth in order to obtain bubbles. It appears that IPO of new-technologies are 
best candidates to exhibit bubbles since buyers do not observe each other's tastes and 
wealth at IPO date. After the IPO agents can collect market data, deduce the moments 
that characterize the stochastic process and revise their strategy based on that 
information. With new-technology shares however the market data is noisy and might 
require a long sample, i.e., investment in new-technology assets imply the undertaking of 
uninsurable risk at least for some period post-IPO. IPOs of companies with existing 
technologies should not exhibit bubbles since agents can hedge the IPO share by holding 
assets who's covariability with the IPO asset is non-zero. As long as contingent claims for 
the new technology do not exist, the only way agents can insure the wealth they hold at 
the new-technology is by applying dynamic asset allocation strategies. The above 
Momentum and Contrarian strategies are such optimal strategies as they imply replication 
of option.  
Figure 3a illustrates the average growth rates of the three generic possibilities 
(REE, MDE and CDE) and Figure 3b presents an REE stochastic sample path, together 
with an amplification of it under MDE and a dimming version of the same under CDE.  
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                                   Figure 3b 
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Figure 3a presents expected and Figure 3b sample-paths of the three possible share price equilibria 
under marginal trade aggregation. In Figure 3b the three paths use the same vector of dzt, thus differences 
result from agent heterogeneity. If agents who apply a Momentum strategy dominate (MDE) the 
equilibrium path will be an amplification of the PLM. If Contrarian agents dominate, the realized path will 
be a deemed version of the PLM.  
 
C. Reversion of Bubbles to REE - Not Necessarily a "Crash" 
The reason for a "crash" or, more generally, reversion of the ALM to REE is 
intentionally not prescribed in this model in a formal manner. We focused on the 
reasoning of a divergence of ALM from PLM, which implies divergence from the strict 
formal definition of REE. Under this definition, RE assumes agents hold a complete 
knowledge about the economy - its structure (institutions, other agents, markets and 
changes in those) and value of parameters in the economy. Alternatively, agents must at 
least agree on a model of the economy and its parameters. For a stochastic model, 
agreement on the distribution of shocks is also required. Empirical economists who test 
for rationality use past data in order to estimate parameters of a model, or the economy's 
future state, implying that the experts themselves lack complete knowledge. It thus 
appear reasonable to assume that agents conduct procedures as if they were 
econometricians, which means some form of "bounded rationality", as suggested by 
Sargent (1993).   
If diversion of the ALM from PLM is due to incomplete information, as described 
in the model detailed above, the question is what forces govern a reversion to REE? 
There are two types of "add-on" models that can be supplemented to our model. The first 
one stems from the classic view of RE theory. It postulates reversion to REE through 
agent screening, a process under which agents who fail to accurately predict the PLM 
loose their wealth to agents who make accurate predictions and thus are driven out of the 
market in finite time. Since the accurate prediction is the RE solution, the RE pricing will 
prevail (see Sandroni, 2000 for a comprehensive discussion and proofs). Note that this 
view implies that an economy with non price-taking agents end-up with temporary 
deviation from REE, though not necessarily in a boom and crash pattern. If our "boom" 
reverts to REE based on that notion, the reversion need not be sudden ("crash").  
Second type of models comprises the dynamic learning approach. In general, 
these consider economic agents as econometricians who apply statistical tools on past 
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data and use the results to establish optimal future decisions. In that sense, this approach 
set a solid ground for empirical estimation of the above model. In most cases, dynamic 
learning models use Recursive Least Squares, whereby agents are assumed to run 
regressions on historic data and estimate the model parameters, testable ex-post by 
ARMA type processes.12 If the reversion to REE of post-IPO mispricing is based on that 
approach, than by the homogeneous information assumption all agents of a given type 
should apply the same rule once data become available. Since data is available to all 
simultaneously, a prompt adjustment, i.e., a crash, is unavoidable.  
 
V. Summary 
The model proposed above presents a simple technique to calculate asset prices, 
drawing elements from Merton (1971) and standard microeconomic supply/demand 
equilibrium. Its major advantages are its ability to specify a wide spectrum of dynamic 
equilibria; defining a many-to-one correspondence between measures or risk aversion and 
investment strategies and allowing empirical tests for temporary mispricing. It turns out 
that in-spite of homogenous information and rationality, there are infinite combinations 
of tastes (risk aversion) that result in the single REE path. In addition, we define two sets 
of temporary equilibria other than the REE. One is a set of Momentum Dominance 
Equilibria (MDE) in which variability and drift of a PLM are linearly amplified. The 
second is a set of Contrarian Dominance Equilibria (CDE) where the ALM exhibits linear 
dimmed variability and drift vs. the PLM.  
We achieve this variety of equilibria since we add a new degree of freedom to 
asset pricing, being marginal supply and demand functions for shares. We derive the 
marginal functions from investment strategies that are based on the agent's utility 
function. The marginal supply/demand functions look like regular microeconomic ones, 
and in particular they are twice differentiable and strictly convex over the entire domain. 
These functions may as well serve in the empirical study of price formation being 
normative bid and ask aggregate functions. 
The model is essentially a model of bubbles, while the reversion to REE may be 
gradual, if some agents who accurately predict the PLM drive the others out of the 
market. Or, it can end in a "crash" when information from post-IPO market prices makes 
it clear to all shareholders that the ALM has been constructed based on moments higher 
than those at the PLM. 
                                                          
12 Evans and Honkapohja, 2001 provide a comprehensive survey and detailed expositions of the subject 
from different perspectives. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1 
Risk Aversion Properties of a HARA Type Utility Function 
Investor Risk 
Attitude 
Values Obtained for Specific 
Conditions 
Function/ 
Measure of Risk Aversion 
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
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Source: Merton (1971). 
Table 1 shows that the HARA type utility function can produce absolute or relative measure of risk 
aversion, either can be decreasing, increasing or constant. We ignore increasing constant and relative risk 
aversions. 
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Appendix 2 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
A marginal demand function for shares must maintain a negative slope for (10),  
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Since the market price for risk ˆ  is ex-ante positive and C  must be strictly positive to 
assure risk aversion, than the numerator must be positive, which implies 
CttCC D  /
~
,  . By restricting C , we implicitly limit C  as well. Solving the asset 
allocation problem (8), for 
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Thus, 0
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,  CCttCD   imply 
ˆC . Convexity of the marginal demand function 
for shares will be satisfied if the second derivative is positive,  
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Given the restrictions in (A1) and (A2), (A3) will be satisfied iff the denominator is 
positive, thus C
ttC
tC
N
N
 
,
,ˆ0 . 
Q.E.D. 
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Appendix 3 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Upward slope of the payoff schedule requires (12) to satisfy 0
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which implies MttMM D  /
~
,  . Assuming agents M are in aggregate net lenders, 
than M  must be strictly negative. In order to define the conditions on M , solve (8) for 
M
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Based on MttMM D  /
~
,  , (A5) imply 
ˆM . In order to assess convexity, the 
derivative of (A4) must be positive, 
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which implies the denominator must be negative, thus the stricter inequality 
ttM
tM
M
N
N


,
,ˆ  must hold. Note that (A6) cannot be zero since the numerator is strictly 
negative. In addition, by the assumption of risk aversion, M  must be positive, thus 
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